The current ecological crisis is a matter of urgent global concern, with solutions being sought on many fronts. In this book, Seyyed Hossein Nasr argues that the devastation of our world has been exacerbated, if not actually caused, by the reductionist view of nature that has been advanced by modern secular science. What is needed, he believes, is the recovery of the truth to which the great, enduring religions all attest; namely that nature is sacred. Nasr traces the historical (...) process through which Western civilization moved away from the idea of nature as sacred and embraced a world view which sees humans as alienated from nature and nature itself as a machine to be dominated and manipulated by humans. His goal is to negate the totalitarian claims of modern science and to re-open the way to the religious view of the order of nature, developed over centuries in the cosmologies and sacred sciences of the great traditions. Each tradition, Nasr shows, has a wealth of knowledge and experience concerning the order of nature. The resuscitation of this knowledge, he argues, would allow religions all over the globe to enrich each other and cooperate to heal the wounds inflicted upon the Earth. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1. Mulla Sadra and his socio-political and cultural situation -- 2. The central importance of philosophical psychology in Sadra's politics -- 3. Transcendent politics -- 4. Justice -- 5. The ideal state -- 6. Political leadership -- Conclusion.

Knowledge and its desacralization --What is tradition? -- The rediscovery of the sacred : the revival of tradition -- Scientia sacra -- Man, pontifical and Promethean -- The cosmos as theophany -- Eternity and the temporal order -- Traditional art as fountain of knowledge and grace -- Principal knowledge and the multiplicity of sacred forms -- Knowledge of the sacred as deliverance.

Accession Number: ATLA0001712108; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 71-86.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 86.; Rev from an article in The Islamic quarterly.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

The fruit of several centuries of rationalistic thought in the West has been to reduce both the objective and the subjective poles of knowledge to a single level. In the same way that the Cogito of Descartes is based on reducing the knowing subject to a single mode of awareness, the external world which this ‘knowing self’ perceives is reduced to a spatio-temporal complex limited to a single level of reality – no matter how far this complex is extended beyond (...) the galaxies or into aeons of time, past and future. The traditional view as expressed in the metaphysical teachings of both the Eastern and Western traditions is based, on the contrary, upon a hierarchic vision of reality, not only of reality's objective aspect but also of its subjective one. Not only are there many levels of reality or existence stretching from the material plane to Absolute and Infinite Reality, but there are also many levels of subjective reality or consciousness, many envelopes of the self, leading to the Ultimate Self which is Infinite and Eternal and which is none other than the Transcendent Reality beyond. Moreover, the relation between the subjective and the objective is not bound to a single mode. There is not just one form of perception or awareness. There are modes and degrees of awareness leading from the so-called ‘normal’ perception by man of both his own ‘ego’ and the external world to awareness of Ultimate Selfhood, in which the subject and object of knowledge become unified in a single reality beyond all separation and distinction. (shrink)

The problem of supererogation has attracted significant attention from contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we show that this problem was outlined in different terms in the work of the 11th century Persian philosopher Abū Alī Miskawayh. As well as identifying this problem, Miskawayh also developed a unique solution cashed out in terms of virtue ethics that has not yet been considered in the contemporary literature. We will argue that this solution, which is in its general form independent of virtue (...) ethics, provides a plausible explanation of what makes some acts supererogatory and faces two important advantages over the most popular response to the problem of supererogation, The Sacrifice View. Unlike The Sacrifice View, The Cautionary Account can class acts of benevolence that advance the agent's own interests as supererogatory and easily explain why certain acts of sacrifice are neither permissible nor praiseworthy. (shrink)

Epistemologists have widely accepted that truth, justification, and belief are necessary conditions for knowledge. This article challenges the necessity of the two components, “belief” and “justification”, in the definition of knowledge. It argues that belief is distinct from knowledge; belief is an act of will, whereas knowledge is acquired automatically. One may possess knowledge without being actively willing to believe it, and conversely, one may will to believe something without actually knowing it. Additionally, justification should be seen as a method (...) of validating knowledge, not a fundamental part of its definition. Therefore, knowledge without justification remains knowledge, even though its truth cannot be proven. Building on this perspective, the proposed definition of knowledge shifts to “awareness or recognition of facts.” According to this definition, the Gettier problem and the lottery paradox find alternative solutions. (shrink)

Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...) assumption. This suggests that there is some sort of report condition on motivating reasons. In contrast, one may ask whether it is possible for the agent to be mistaken about what their motivating reasons are. I argue that we can distinguish motivating reasons and satisfy the motivations for the explanatory-motivating distinction without committing to this infallibility assumption. I briefly sketch a character-based approach to motivating reasons as an alternative. Next, I argue that, in addition to being important on its own, this account has implications for other debates. I illustrate this by mentioning cases such as recalcitrant actions as well as critically discussing one kind of counter-example presented against the guise of the good thesis. (shrink)

The possibility of acting for normative reasons calls for explanation, considering that such reasons are facts. Facing this issue, some argue that to act for a normative reason, the normative reason and the reason we act for (i.e. the motivating reason) need to be identical. Others reject the idea that normative reasons are facts in the first place. A conciliatory proposal is that by appealing to dispositions we can simultaneously accept that normative reasons are facts and that we can act (...) for them, without accepting the identity of the normative reasons and the motivating reason. After sketching an example of such a view, I mention an obstacle on its way. This view relies heavily on the correspondence relation, to make the action connected to the normative reason via a descriptive belief. It is argued that this is challenging since the correspondence relation might not be suitable to play the metaphysical role needed. (shrink)

A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the possibility that this world, with (...) all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

The prevalence of teams in contemporary organizations and the trend toward diversity in a workforce composed of members from multiple countries have drawn the attention of researchers on the consequences of diversity in workplaces. While there are potential benefits to diversity, relationship conflicts among team members may also result and affect team functioning. The aim of the present study was to explore how supervisors’ social dominance orientation, a tendency to support the arbitrary dominance of specific social groups over others, may (...) relate to relationship conflicts and reduced team commitment within teams. A two-wave study in a sample of 931 individuals from 108 workgroups was conducted to examine the relationship between supervisors’ social dominance orientation and team functioning. Analyses indicated that supervisor social dominance orientation was associated with increased within-team differentiation of leader-member exchange relationships based on team members’ national origin. Such LMX differentiation was related to more within-team relationship conflict and in turn to reduced collective team commitment. The implications of these findings for research on supervisor social dominance orientation, within-team nationality diversity, and team functioning are discussed. (shrink)

One of the premises of the argument from design is the need for the order of a designer. This premise has been explained in various ways, one of which is the calculus of probabilities. It posits that the likelihood of an ordered thing coming into existence by chance is so low that human beings consider it nearly impossible; therefore, this order requires an intelligent designer. However, some contemporary Muslim philosophers, such as Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī, along with certain Western philosophers, have (...) contested the validity of the calculus of probabilities. They argue that the calculus of probabilities does not reveal reality but is merely practically useful. They assert that undesigned states have the same probability as designed states. In this article, I address these objections, refute them, and ultimately demonstrate the soundness of the argument from design based on the calculus of probabilities. (shrink)

Various theories concerning how to speak positively about God have been proposed. One such theory, the theory of complete univocity, states that although the mode of existence between God and human beings is different, there are, in principle, ontological commonalities between God and humans in existence and His attributes. These ontological commonalities make it possible to attribute a single meaning to both God and human beings univocally. In this article, it is attempted to both explain and defend the theory of (...) complete univocity, while also critiquing the theory of partial univocity, a theory which believes solely in semantic univocity and ontologically assumes that God is absolutely different and separate from humans. Further, as the commonality of meaning between God and humans requires the existence of an ontological commonality between them, the theory of analogy is also not acceptable. Because, firstly, the denial of shared attributes between God and humans has many unsatisfactory theological implications. Secondly, there is no middle term between univocity and equivocality. Therefore, the only theologically defensible theory is that of complete univocity. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents of substance dualism are explained and (...) criticized in this respect. Based on this, it becomes clear that the interaction of soul and body has a reasonable philosophical explanation, the problem of the pairing of soul and body, although it may not have a scientific explanation, it has a philosophical and theological solution, the principle of the physical causal closure lacks conclusive reasons and cannot reject the existence of the soul, the existence of the soul does not contradict the theory of evolution, the dependence of the soul on the brain is compatible with its independence, and finally, the principle of simplicity does not make any problem for accepting the substance dualism. (shrink)

The issue of Islam and modern science, along with its progeny, modern technology, continues today as one of the most crucial faced by the Islamic community. It has been, and continues to be, addressed by numerous scholars and thinkers, covering nearly the whole gamut of the spectrum of Islamic intellectual activity since the last century. This article analyses modern science and subjects it to an in-depth criticism from the Islamic point of view, drawing from the Islamic intellectual tradition. It holds (...) that any science that could legitimately be called Islamic science, and not be disruptive of the whole Islamic order, must be one that remains aware of the ‘vertical cause’ of all things, along with the horizontal, a science that issues from and returns to the Real, who is the cause of all things. (shrink)

In discussing the intricate and somewhat complex relationship between Shiʻism and Sufism, both in principle and essence or in their metahistorical reality as well as in time and history, we need hardly concern ourselves with the too often repeated criticism made by certain orientalists who would doubt the Islamic and Quranic character of both Shiʻism and Sufism. Basing themselves on an a priori assumption that Islam is not a revelation and, even if a religion, is only a simple ‘religion of (...) the sword’ for a simple desert people, such would-be critics brush aside as un-Islamic all that speaks of gnosis and esotericism, pointing to the lack of historical texts in the early period as proof of their thesis, as if the non-existent in itself could disprove the existence of something which may have existed without leaving a written trace for us to dissect and analyse today. The reality of Shiʻism and Sufism as integral aspects of the Islamic revelation is too blinding to be neglected or brushed aside by any would-be historical argument. The fruit is there to prove that the tree has its roots in a soil that nourishes it. And the spiritual fruit can only be borne by a tree whose roots are sunk in a revealed truth. To deny this most evident of truths would be as if we were to doubt the Christian sanctity of a St Francis of Assisi because the historical records of the first years of the Apostolic succession are not clear. What the presence of St Francis proves is in reality the opposite fact, namely, that the Apostolic succession must be real even if no historical records are at hand. The same holds true mutatis mutandis for Shiʻism and Sufism. In this paper in any case we will begin by taking for granted the Islamic character of Shiʻism and Sufism and upon this basis delve into their relationship. In fact Shiʻism and Sufism are both, in different ways and on different levels, intrinsic aspects of Islamic orthodoxy, this term being taken not only in its theological sense but in its universal sense as tradition and universal truth contained within a revealed form. (shrink)

The Ismaili is one of the sub-sects of Shiite sect which in addition to being involved in some specific events in the history of different regions in the world of Islam from India to Iran and North Africa has been able to form governments. The record of Ismaili’s presence in Azerbaijan goes back to the third century A.H and the ruling period of Mosafer and Sajian in the fourth century A.H that continued to Seljuqs and Ilkhanids periods. Upon Mongol attacks (...) the center of Immamat moved to Azerbaijan, during 8 and 9th century A.H and this coincided with the Nezari Ismaili’s internal evaluations in Iran. The level of Ismaili sect’s presence in and its contribution to Azerbaijan between 4th and 10th century A.H is assessed here through a descriptive-analytic method and library studies. (shrink)

One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means that the proposition is true in all possible worlds and by a posteriori knowledge he means that its truth is known by experiment or investigation. Some (...) philosophers have given arguments against Kripke’s doctrine and claimed that such propositions can, also, be known a priori. In this paper, I will defend Kripke’s view by showing that his approach to the issue is linguistic not metaphysical, opposite to his critics. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore one line of argument for the Humean Theory of Reasons, the view that all normative reasons are based on desires. Then, I suggest a way to block that argument inspired by Aquinas’s discussions on choice, will, and indeterminacy of reason alone.

Although the crisis of the relationship between man and the world of nature on the scale observable today first began in the West where modernism was born, it is now global and demands an inquiry beyond the borders of the Western tradition and the history of the attack against that tradition in modern times. Any inquiry into the question of the relation between religion and the order of nature, one that wishes to address the crucial issues emanating from the present-day (...) environmental crisis, needs to cross the frontiers of various spiritual universes and journey from the Heaven and Earth of a single human collectivity to the many Heavens and Earths of the several “humanities” constituting present-day global humanity as such. To understand the relation of religion to the order of nature on a global scale, rather than from the perspective of a single tradition, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the order of nature or the “Earth” in the context of various religions. (shrink)

The transformation of the meaning of the order of nature in both philosophy and science cannot be fully understood without delving fully into Renaissance humanism and the new conception of man that appears in stages at that time and leads within a short period to an image of man and his relation to God, of other peoples, and of the order of nature radically different from what had existed in the medieval period in the Christian West and also from what (...) exists today in all non-Western civilizations to the extent that they remain faithful to their own traditions. This chapter demonstrates how the type of humanism that grew in the Renaissance developed in a direction so different from other traditions that it denied all historical links with the Islamic adab tradition from which it had drawn so much and even developed a particular hatred for Islam. (shrink)

According to a rule of traditional logic concerning the relation between general (or universal) concepts, if a given concept is more general than a second one, then the opposition (or contradictory) of the first concept is more specific than the opposition (or contradictory) of the second one. Kātibī, one of the Muslim logicians in the 13th century, has raised a question against this rule and, by giving some counterexamples, claims that it results in contradiction. Some Muslim logicians have replied to (...) Kātibī, and in this paper I have examined their replies. Also, by using rules of modern logic, we may easily show that either Kātibī's argumentation is fallacious or it does not result in contradiction; however, it seems that if modern logic rules had been represented to Muslim logicians, some of those rules would have been rejected by them. (shrink)